Detecting security attacks using workspace orchestration logs

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods for detecting security attacks using workspace orchestration logs are described. In some embodiments, a workspace orchestration server may include a processor and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution, may cause the server to: maintain a first workspace orchestration log, receive a second workspace orchestration log from a client Information Handling System (IHS), and identify the security attack, at least in part, in response to a discrepancy between the first and second workspace orchestration logs.

FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to Information Handling Systems(IHSs), and, more specifically, to systems and methods for detectingsecurity attacks using workspace orchestration logs.

BACKGROUND

As the value and use of information continues to increase, individualsand businesses seek additional ways to process and store it. One optionavailable to users is an Information Handling System (IHS). An IHSgenerally processes, compiles, stores, and/or communicates informationor data for business, personal, or other purposes thereby allowing usersto take advantage of the value of the information. Because technologyand information handling needs and requirements vary between differentusers or applications, IHSs may also vary regarding what information ishandled, how the information is handled, how much information isprocessed, stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently theinformation may be processed, stored, or communicated.

Variations in IHSs allow for IHSs to be general or configured for aspecific user or specific use such as financial transaction processing,airline reservations, enterprise data storage, or global communications.In addition, IHSs may include a variety of hardware and softwarecomponents that may be configured to process, store, and communicateinformation and may include one or more computer systems, data storagesystems, and networking systems.

SUMMARY

Systems and methods for detecting security attacks using workspaceorchestration logs are described. In an illustrative, non-limitingembodiment, a workspace orchestration server may include a processor anda memory coupled to the processor, the memory having programinstructions stored thereon that, upon execution, may cause the serverto: maintain a first workspace orchestration log, receive a secondworkspace orchestration log from a client Information Handling System(IHS), and identify the security attack, at least in part, in responseto a discrepancy between the first and second workspace orchestrationlogs.

The first workspace orchestration log may include one or moreorchestration operations and a time of each orchestration operation asrecorded by the workspace orchestration server, and the second workspaceorchestration log comprises one or more orchestration operations and atime of each orchestration operation as recorded by the client IHS. Thediscrepancy between the first and second workspace orchestration logsmay include at least one of: a missing orchestration operation, or adifferent sequence of orchestration operations.

The orchestration operations may include at least one of: a start of aworkspace definition download, an end of a workspace definitiondownload, a workspace instantiation, or a workspace migration. Theprogram instructions, upon execution, further cause the server toidentify the discrepancy using a sliding window. The security attack mayinclude a Person-in-the-Middle attack.

The program instructions, upon execution, may cause the server to:receive a third workspace orchestration log from another workspaceorchestration server in communication with the client IHS, and identifythe security attack, at least in part, in response to a discrepancybetween the first and third workspace orchestration logs.

Additionally, or alternatively, the program instructions, uponexecution, may cause the server to: receive a third workspaceorchestration log from the client IHS over a redundant communicationchannel, and identify the security attack, at least in part, in responseto a discrepancy between the second and third workspace orchestrationlogs.

Additionally, or alternatively, the program instructions, uponexecution, may cause the server to: instruct another client IHS toinstantiate a workspace based upon a workspace definition used by theclient IHS; receive a third workspace orchestration log from the otherclient IHS; and identify the security attack, at least in part, inresponse to a discrepancy between the second and third workspaceorchestration logs.

Additionally, or alternatively, the program instructions, uponexecution, may cause the server to: compare a number of second workspaceorchestration logs received from the client IHS against a number ofthird workspace orchestration logs received from another client IHS,where the client IHS is configured to instantiate a workspace based upona workspace definition, and where the other client IHS is configured toinstantiate another workspace based upon the workspace definition, andidentify the security attack, at least in part, in response to adeviation between the numbers of second and third workspaceorchestration logs.

Additionally, or alternatively, the program instructions, uponexecution, may cause the server to: receive contextual measurements fromthe client IHS, compare the contextual measurements against goldenmeasurements associated with a workspace definition of a workspaceinstantiated by the client IHS; and identify the security attack, atleast in part, in response to a difference between a contextualmeasurement and a corresponding golden measurement.

The contextual measurements may include at least one of: a thermalmeasurement, an acoustic measurement, a workspace memory utilization, anetwork signature, or a communication latency. The program instructions,upon execution, further cause the server to create the goldenmeasurements based upon average measurements collected from a pluralityof client IHSs executing distinct instances of a workspace instantiatedusing a same workspace definition.

In another illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a memory storagedevice may have program instructions stored thereon that, upon executionby an IHS, cause the IHS to: maintain a first workspace orchestrationlog; receive a second workspace orchestration log from a client IHS;receive contextual measurements from the client IHS; receive goldenmeasurements associated with a workspace definition of a workspaceinstantiated by the client IHS; and identify a security attack, at leastin part, in response to at least one of: (a) a discrepancy between thefirst and second workspace orchestration logs, or (b) a differencebetween a contextual measurement and a corresponding golden measurement.

In another illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a method may include:maintaining a first workspace orchestration log; receiving a secondworkspace orchestration log from a client IHS; receiving contextualmeasurements from the client IHS; receiving golden measurementsassociated with a workspace definition of a workspace instantiated bythe client IHS; and identifying a security attack, at least in part, inresponse to: (a) a discrepancy between the first and second workspaceorchestration logs, and (b) a difference between a contextualmeasurement and a corresponding golden measurement.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention(s) is/are illustrated by way of example and is/arenot limited by the accompanying figures, in which like referencesindicate similar elements. Elements in the figures are illustrated forsimplicity and clarity and have not necessarily been drawn to scale.

FIG. 1 is a diagram depicting examples of components of an InformationHandling System (IHS) configured to modernize workspace and hardwarelifecycle management in an enterprise productivity ecosystem, accordingto various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a diagram depicting an example of a method for modernizingworkspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIGS. 3A and 3B are a diagram depicting an example of a systemconfigured to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management inan enterprise productivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a diagram of an example of a heterogeneous workloadenvironment, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a diagram of an example of a method for detecting securityattacks using workspace orchestration logs, according to variousembodiments.

FIG. 6 is a diagram of an example of a method for detecting securityattacks using parallel workspace orchestration services, according tovarious embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a diagram of an example of a method for detecting securityattacks using fleet baselines, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 8 is a diagram of an example of a method for detecting securityattacks using redundant communication channels, according to variousembodiments.

FIG. 9 is a diagram of an example of a method for detecting securityattacks using redundant workspaces, according to various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

For purposes of this disclosure, an IHS may include any instrumentalityor aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, calculate,determine, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate,switch, store, display, communicate, manifest, detect, record,reproduce, handle, or utilize any form of information, intelligence, ordata for business, scientific, control, or other purposes. For example,an IHS may be a personal computer (e.g., desktop or laptop), tabletcomputer, mobile device (e.g., Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or smartphone), server (e.g., blade server or rack server), a network storagedevice, or any other suitable device and may vary in size, shape,performance, functionality, and price. An example of an IHS is describedin more detail below. FIG. 1 shows various internal components of an IHSconfigured to implement certain of the described embodiments. It shouldbe appreciated that although certain embodiments described herein may bediscussed in the context of a personal computing device, otherembodiments may utilize various other types of IHSs.

FIG. 1 is a diagram depicting components of an example IHS 100configured to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management inan enterprise productivity ecosystem, as well as to detect securityattacks using workspace orchestration logs. In some embodiments, IHS 100may be employed to instantiate, manage, and/or terminate a workspace,such as a secure environment that may provide the user of IHS 100 withaccess to enterprise data while isolating the enterprise data from anOperating System (OS) and/or other applications executed by IHS 100.

As shown in FIG. 1 , IHS 100 includes one or more processor(s) 101, suchas a Central Processing Unit (CPU), operable to execute code retrievedfrom system memory 105. Although IHS 100 is illustrated with a singleprocessor, other embodiments may include two or more processors, thatmay each be configured identically, or to provide specialized processingfunctions. Processor(s) 101 may include any processor capable ofexecuting program instructions, such as an INTEL PENTIUM seriesprocessor or any general-purpose or embedded processors implementing anyof a variety of Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs), such as the x86,POWERPC®, ARM®, SPARC®, or MIPS® ISAs, or any other suitable ISA. In theembodiment of FIG. 1 , processor(s) 101 includes an integrated memorycontroller 118 that may be implemented directly within the circuitry ofprocessor(s) 101, or memory controller 118 may be a separate integratedcircuit that is located on the same die as processor(s) 101. Memorycontroller 118 may be configured to manage the transfer of data to andfrom system memory 105 of IHS 100 via high-speed memory interface 104.

System memory 105 that is coupled to processor(s) 101 via memory bus 104provides processor(s) 101 with a high-speed memory that may be used inthe execution of computer program instructions by processor(s) 101.Accordingly, system memory 105 may include memory components, such assuch as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), NAND Flash memory,suitable for supporting high-speed memory operations by processor(s)101. In some embodiments, system memory 105 may combine both persistent,non-volatile memory and volatile memory.

In certain embodiments, system memory 105 includes secure storage 120that may be a portion of the system memory designated for storage ofinformation, such as access policies, component signatures, encryptionkeys, and other cryptographic information, for use in hosting a secureworkspace on IHS 100. In such embodiments, a signature may be calculatedbased on the contents of secure storage 120 and stored as a referencesignature. The integrity of the data stored in secure storage 120 maythen be validated at a later time by recalculating this signature of thecontents of the secure storage and comparing the recalculated signatureagainst the reference signature.

IHS 100 utilizes chipset 103 that may include one or more integratedcircuits that are coupled to processor(s) 101. In the embodiment of FIG.1 , processor(s) 101 is depicted as a component of chipset 103. In otherembodiments, all of chipset 103, or portions of chipset 108 may beimplemented directly within the integrated circuitry of processor(s)101. Chipset 103 provides processor(s) 101 with access to a variety ofresources accessible via bus 102. In IHS 100, bus 102 is illustrated asa single element. However, other implementations may utilize any numberof buses to provide the illustrated pathways served by bus 102.

As illustrated, a variety of resources may be coupled to processor(s)101 of IHS 100 through chipset 103. For instance, chipset 103 may becoupled to network interface 109, such as provided by a NetworkInterface Controller (NIC) that is coupled to IHS 100 and allows IHS 100to communicate via a network, such as the Internet or a LAN. Networkinterface device 109 may provide IHS 100 with wired and/or wirelessnetwork connections via a variety of network technologies, such aswireless cellular or mobile networks (CDMA, TDMA, LTE etc.), WIFI andBLUETOOTH. In certain embodiments, network interface 109 may supportconnections between a trusted IHS component, such as trusted controller115, and a remote orchestration service. In such embodiments, aconnection supported by network interface 109 between the remoteorchestration service and the trusted component may be considered anout-of-band (00B) connection that is isolated from the OS of the IHS.

Chipset 102 may also provide access to one or more display device(s) 108via graphics processor 107. In certain embodiments, graphics processor107 may be comprised within one or more video or graphics cards or anembedded controller installed as components of IHS 100. Graphicsprocessor 107 may generate display information and provide the generatedinformation to one or more display device(s) 108 coupled to IHS 100,where display device(s) 108 may include integrated display devicesand/or external display devices coupled to IHS, such as via an I/O port116, where display device(s) 108 may include integrated display devicesand/or external display devices coupled to IHS. In certain embodiments,graphics processor 107 may be integrated within processor 101. The oneor more display devices 108 coupled to IHS 100 may utilize LCD, LED,OLED, or other thin film display technologies. Each display device 108may be capable of touch input such as via a touch controller that may bean embedded component of display device 108, graphics processor 107, ora separate component of IHS 100 accessed via bus 102.

In certain embodiments, chipset 103 may utilize one or more I/Ocontrollers to access hardware components such as user input devices 111and sensors 112. For instance, I/O controller 110 may provide access touser-input devices 110 such as a keyboard, mouse, touchpad, touchscreenand/or other peripheral input devices. User input devices 111 mayinterface with I/O controller 110 through wired or wireless connections.Sensors 112 accessed via I/O controllers 110 may provide access to datadescribing environmental and operating conditions of IHS 100 (e.g.,accelerometers, gyroscopes, hinge sensors, rotation sensors, hall effectsensors, temperature sensors, voltage sensors, sensors, IR sensors,photosensors, proximity sensors, distance sensors, magnetic sensors,microphones, ultrasonic sensors, etc.).

In some cases, chipset 103 may include a sensor hub capable of utilizinginformation collected by sensors 112 in determining the relativeorientation and movement of IHS 100. For instance, the sensor hub mayutilize inertial movement sensors, that may include accelerometer,gyroscope, and magnetometer sensors, and are capable of determining theorientation and movement of IHS 100 (e.g., IHS 100 is motionless on arelatively flat surface, IHS 100 is being moved irregularly and islikely in transport, the hinge of IHS 100 is oriented in a verticaldirection). In certain embodiments, the sensor hub may also includecapabilities for determining a location and movement of IHS 100 based ontriangulation of network signal and based on network informationprovided by the OS or network interface 109. In some embodiments, thesensor hub may support additional sensors, such as optical, infrared andsonar sensors, that may provide support for xR (virtual, augmented,and/or mixed reality) sessions hosted by the IHS 100 and may be used bythe sensor hub provide an indication of a user's presence near IHS 100,such as whether a user is present, absent, and/or facing integrateddisplay 108.

In cases where the end-user is present before IHS 100, the sensor hubmay further determine a distance of the end-user from the IHS, wherethis determination may be made continuously, at periodic intervals, orupon request. The detected or calculated distances may be used byprocessor 101 to classify the user as being in the IHS's near-field(user's position<threshold distance A), mid-field (threshold distanceA<user's position<threshold distance B, where B>A), or far-field (user'sposition>threshold distance C, where C>B). As described in additionaldetail below, the failure to detect an authenticated user of IHS 100within a proximity of IHS 100 may result in a change in the securityprofile of IHS 100, thus triggering a re-evaluation of the security riskof workspaces operating on IHS 100. Similar re-evaluation may betriggered based on the detection of additional individuals in proximityto IHS 100.

In embodiments where IHS 100 may support multiple physicalconfigurations, such as a convertible laptop, N-in-1 device, or thelike, the sensor hub may utilize one or more mode sensors 112 thatcollect readings that may be used in determining the posture in whichIHS 100 is physically configured. In certain embodiments, such posturedeterminations may be additionally made using the movement andorientation information provided by sensors 112. In laptop andconvertible laptop embodiments, for example, processor 101 or trustedcontroller 115 may utilize a lid position sensor 112 to determine therelative angle between the two panels of the laptop in order todetermine the mode in which IHS 100 is physically configured. In suchembodiments, the lid position sensor may measure the angle of rotationof the hinge that connects the base panel and lid panel of IHS 100. Insome embodiments, processor 101 or trusted controller 115 may providecollected lid position information, such as the hinge angle, to thesensor hub for use in determining the posture in which IHS 100 isconfigured. In some embodiments, the sensor hub may interface directlywith the lid position sensor in determining hinge angle information.

The sensor hub may determine the posture of IHS 100 based, at least inpart, on the angle of rotation of the hinge of IHS 100 from a closedposition. A first range of hinge angles from a closed position mayindicate a laptop posture, a second range of hinge angles may indicate alandscape posture and a third range of angles may indicate a tabletposture. The sensor hub may additionally utilize orientation andmovement information collected from inertial movement sensors 112 tofurther determine the posture in which IHS 100 is physically configured.For instance, if the sensor hub determines that IHS 100 is configuredwith a hinge angle of a laptop configuration, but IHS 100 is oriented onits side, the IHS may be determined to be in a book mode. If IHS 100 isdetermined to be tilted such that the hinge is oriented betweenhorizontal and vertical, the user's face is detected to be facing theintegrated display, and IHS 100 is experiencing slight movement, thesensor hub may determine that IHS 100 is being used in a book posture.The sensor hub may determine that IHS 100 is opened to a 180-degreehinge angle and lies on a flat surface, thus indicating that IHS 100 itis being used in a landscape posture. The sensor hub may similarlydetermine that IHS 100 is in a tent configuration, in response todetecting a hinge angle within a defined range, such as between 300 and345 degrees, and also detecting an orientation of IHS 100 where thehinge is aligned horizontally and is higher than both of the displaypanels of IHS 100.

Other components of IHS 100 may include one or more I/O ports 116 forcommunicating with peripheral external devices as well as various inputand output devices. For instance, I/O 116 ports may include HDMI(High-Definition Multimedia Interface) ports for use in connectingexternal display devices to IHS 100 and USB (Universal Serial Bus)ports, by which a variety of external devices may be coupled to IHS 100.In some embodiments, external devices coupled to IHS 100 via an I/O port116 may include storage devices that support transfer of data to andfrom system memory 105 and/or storage devices 119 of IHS 100. Asdescribed in additional detail below, the coupling of storage devicesvia an I/O port 116 may result in a change in the security profile ofIHS 100, thus triggering a re-evaluation of the security risk ofworkspaces operating on IHS 100.

Chipset 103 also provides processor(s) 101 with access to one or morestorage devices 119. In various embodiments, storage device 119 may beintegral to IHS 100, or may be external to IHS 100. In certainembodiments, storage device 119 may be accessed via a storage controllerthat may be an integrated component of the storage device. Storagedevice 119 may be implemented using any memory technology allowing IHS100 to store and retrieve data. For instance, storage device 119 may bea magnetic hard disk storage drive or a solid-state storage drive. Insome embodiments, storage device 119 may be a system of storage devices,such as a cloud drive accessible via network interface 109.

As illustrated, IHS 100 also includes BIOS (Basic Input/Output System)117 that may be stored in a non-volatile memory accessible by chipset103 via bus 102. Upon powering or restarting IHS 100, processor(s) 101may utilize BIOS 117 instructions to initialize and test hardwarecomponents coupled to IHS 100. BIOS 117 instructions may also load an OSfor use by IHS 100. BIOS 117 provides an abstraction layer that allowsthe OS to interface with the hardware components of IHS 100. The UnifiedExtensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) was designed as a successor toBIOS. As a result, many modern IHSs utilize UEFI in addition to orinstead of a BIOS. As used herein, BIOS is intended to also encompassUEFI.

In the illustrated embodiment, BIOS 117 includes a predefined memory ormemory region that may be referred to as NVM (Non-Volatile Memory)mailbox 106. In such an implementation, mailbox 106 may provide asecured storage location for use in storing workspace access policies,signatures, cryptographic keys or other data utilized to host andvalidate a workspace on IHS 100. In certain embodiments, BIOS mailbox106 may be utilized as a secure storage utilized by a remoteorchestration service in order to store access policies andcryptographic keys for use in delivering and deploying a securedcontainer on IHS 100. BIOS mailbox 106 and secured storage 120 in systemmemory 105 may be utilized in this manner instead of, or in conjunctionwith, out-of-band functions implemented by trusted controller 115.

In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 is coupled to IHS 100.For example, trusted controller 115 may be an embedded controller (EC)that is installed as a component of the motherboard of IHS 100. Invarious embodiments, trusted controller 115 may perform variousoperations in support of the delivery and deployment of a workspace toIHS 100. In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 may interoperatewith a remote orchestration service via an out-of-band communicationspathway that is isolated from the OS that runs on IHS 100. Networkinterface 109 may support such out-of-band communications betweentrusted controller 115 and a remote orchestration service.

Trusted controller 115 may receive cryptographic information requiredfor secure delivery and deployment of a workspace to IHS 100. In suchembodiments, the cryptographic information may be stored to securedstorage 121 maintained by trusted controller 115. Additionally, oralternatively, trusted controller 115 may support execution of a trustedoperating environment that may support cryptographic operations used todeploy a workspace on IHS 100. Additionally, or alternatively, trustedcontroller 115 may support deployment of a workspace within the OS ofIHS 100 via an out-of-band communications channel that is isolated fromthe OS and allows the workspace to communicate with a trusted agentprocess of the OS.

Trusted controller 115 may also provide support for certaincryptographic processing used to support secure deployment and operationof workspaces on IHS 100. In some embodiments, such cryptographicprocessing may be provided via operations of a secure operatingenvironment hosted by trusted controller 115 in isolation from thesoftware and other hardware components of IHS 100. In some embodiments,trusted controller 115 may rely on cryptographic processing provided bydedicated cryptographic hardware supported by the IHS, such as a TPM(Trusted Platform Module) microcontroller. In some embodiments, thesecured storage 121 of trusted controller 115 may be utilized to storecryptographic information for use in authorization of workspaces.

In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 may be additionallyconfigured to calculate signatures that uniquely identify individualcomponents of IHS 100. In such scenarios, trusted controller 115 maycalculate a hash value based on the configuration of a hardware and/orsoftware component coupled to IHS 100. For instance, trusted controller115 may calculate a hash value based on all firmware and other code orsettings stored in an onboard memory of a hardware component, such as anetwork interface 109. Such hash values may be calculated as part of atrusted process of manufacturing IHS 100 and may be maintained in thesecure storage 121 as a reference signature.

Trusted controller 115 may be further configured to recalculate a hashvalue at a later time for such a component. The hash value recalculatedfor the component may then be compared against the reference hash valuesignature in order to determine if any modifications have been made to acomponent, thus indicating the component has been compromised. In thismanner, trusted controller 115 may be used to validate the integrity ofhardware and software components installed on IHS 100. In certainembodiments, remote orchestration service 206 may verify the integrityof trusted controller 115 in the same manner, by calculating a signatureof trusted controller 115 and comparing it to a reference signaturecalculated during a trusted process for manufacture of IHS 100. Invarious embodiments, one or more of these operations supported bytrusted controller 115 may be implemented using BIOS 117.

Trusted controller 115 may also implement operations for interfacingwith a power adapter in managing power for IHS 100. Such operations maybe utilized to determine the power status of IHS 100, such as whetherIHS 100 is operating from battery power or is plugged into an AC powersource. Firmware instructions utilized by trusted controller 115 may beused to operate a secure execution environment that may includeoperations for providing various core functions of IHS 100, such aspower management and management of certain operating modes of IHS 100(e.g., turbo modes, maximum operating clock frequencies of certaincomponents, etc.).

In managing operating modes of IHS 100, trusted controller 115 mayimplement operations for detecting certain changes to the physicalconfiguration of IHS 100 and managing the modes corresponding todifferent physical configurations of IHS 100. For instance, where IHS100 is a laptop computer or a convertible laptop computer, trustedcontroller 115 may receive inputs from a lid position sensor 112 thatmay detect whether the two sides of the laptop have been latchedtogether to a closed position. In response to lid position sensor 112detecting latching of the lid of IHS 100, trusted controller 115 mayinitiate operations for shutting down IHS 100 or placing IHS 100 in alow-power mode.

IHS 100 may support the use of various power modes. In some embodiments,the power modes of IHS 100 may be implemented through operations oftrusted controller 115 and/or the OS of IHS 100. In various embodiments,IHS 100 may support various reduced power modes in order to reduce powerconsumption and/or conserve battery power when IHS 100 is not activelyin use, and/or to control a level of performance available to the userby increasing or decreasing a maximum operating clock frequency of acomponent of IHS 100 (e.g., processor(s) 101).

In some embodiments, an IHS 100 may not include all of the componentsshown in FIG. 1 . In other embodiments, an IHS 100 may include othercomponents in addition to those that are shown in FIG. 1 . Furthermore,some components that are represented as separate components in FIG. 1may instead be integrated with other components. For example, in certainembodiments, all or a portion of the operations executed by theillustrated components may instead be provided by components integratedinto processor(s) 101 as a System-on-Chip.

In some embodiments, the construction of a workspace for a particularpurpose and for use in a particular context may be orchestrated remotelyfrom IHS 100 by workspace orchestration services 206, such as describedwith regard to FIG. 2 . In some embodiments, portions of the workspaceorchestration may be performed locally on IHS 100. IHS 100 may beconfigured with program instructions that, upon execution, cause IHS 100to perform one or more of the various operations disclosed herein. Insome embodiments, IHS 100 may be an element of a larger enterprisesystem that may include any number of similarly configured IHSs innetwork communications with each other.

FIG. 2 is a diagram depicting an example of method 200 for securing adynamic workspace in an enterprise productivity ecosystem. For sake ofillustration, method 200 has been split into three phases: workspaceinitialization phase 200A, workspace orchestration phase 200B, andworkspace termination phase 200C. During initialization 200A, user 201(e.g., an enterprise user) operates an IHS 100 (e.g., a desktop, alaptop, a tablet, a smart phone, etc.) such as described with regard toFIG. 1 within physical environment 202 (e.g., any type of environmentand its associated context, including physical location, geographiclocation, location within a particular facility or building, detectednetworks, time of day, proximity of the user, individuals in thevicinity of IHS 100, etc.).

Method 200 starts with an action by user 201 at a launch point 203 thatmay be, for example, a corporate launch point provided by an employer ofuser 201, a launch point 203 provided by the manufacturer of IHS 100, ora launch point provided as a service to user 201 by a third-party.Particularly, user 201 operates IHS 100 to access launch point 203 thatis provided, for example, in the form of a web portal, a portalapplication running in the OS of IHS 100, a special-purpose portalworkspace operating on IHS 100, or the like. In various implementations,launch point 203 may include Graphical User Interface (GUI) elementsrepresenting different software applications, data sources and/or otherresources that the user may desire to execute and/or manipulate. Invarious embodiments, launch point may provide a graphical, textualand/or audio interface by which data or other resource may be requestedby a user 201. As such, authenticated user 201 may be provided a launchpoint that provides visibility as to one or more software applicationsand an aggregation of user's data sources available across all of theirdatastores (e.g., local storage, cloud storage, etc.).

As described in additional detail below, workspaces for providing user201 with access to requested data or other resources may operate using alocal management agent 332 that operates on IHS 100 and is configured tointeroperate with workspace orchestration service 206. In variousembodiments, launch point 203 may be provided in the form of a portal(e.g., a webpage, OS application or special purpose workspace) thatallows user 201 to request access to managed resources. In variousembodiments, launch point 203 may be hosted by remote workspaceorchestration service 206, local management agent 332 on IHS 100, or anysuitable combination thereof. Examples of launch point 203 technologiesmay include WORKSPACE ONE INTELLIGENT HUB from WMWARE, INC., and DELLHYBRID CLIENT from DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., among others.

Initialization phase 200A begins when user 201 chooses to launch anapplication or access a data source managed by workspace orchestrationservice 206. In response to an access request issued by user 201 (e.g.,the user “clicks” on an icon of launch point 203), local managementagent 332 of IHS 100 collects initial security and productivity contextinformation at 204. For example, security context information mayinclude attributes indicating a security risk associated with: the dataand/or application being requested, a level of risk presented by theuser 201, the hardware utilized by IHS 100, the logical environment ofIHS 100 in which a workspace will be deployed to provide access to therequested data and/or application, and the physical environment 202 inwhich IHS 100 is currently located.

Accordingly, in this disclosure, the term “security context” generallyrefers to data or other information related to a security posture inwhich a workspace will be deployed and utilized, where the securityposture may be based on the user, IHS 100, data to be accessed via theworkspace, and/or environment 202. A security context may be quantifiedas a security risk score in support of evaluations of the level or riskassociated with providing user 201 access to requested data and/orapplication while using IHS 100 in the particular context. A “securityrisk score” generally refers to a numerical value usable to score,quantify, or measure various security characteristics of the securitycontext associated with a request. A risk score may be an aggregatescore associated with the overall security risk context, whereas a “riskmetric” may be a measurement of risk for a sub-category of some part ofthe security context.

For example, security metrics that may be used in the calculation of asecurity risk score for a particular security context may include, butare not limited to: a classification of the requested data source and/orapplication, authentication factors used to identify user 201, thelocation of IHS 100, a role or other group classifications associatedwith user 201, validation of networks in use by IHS 100, type of networkin use by IHS 100, network firewall configurations in use by IHS 100,indicators of attack (IoA), indicators of compromise (IoC) regarding IHS100 or a resource being requested by user 201, patch levels associatedwith the OS and other applications in use on IHS 100, availability ofencryption, type of available encryption, access to secured storage, useof attestable hardware by IHS 100, supported degree of workspaceisolation by IHS 100, etc.

The term “productivity context” generally refers to user productivityassociated with a workspace, user, IHS, or environment. A “productivityscore” generally refers to an index usable to score, quantify, ormeasure various productivity characteristics of a productivity context.Examples of productivity context information include, but are notlimited to: the hardware of the IHS, the software of the IHS, includingthe OS, power states and maximum clock frequencies of selectedcomponents of the IHS, peripheral devices coupled to the IHS, eitherpermanently or temporarily, networks available to the IHS and theperformance characteristics of those networks, software installersavailable on the IHS, etc.

Initial productivity and security targets for a workspace may becalculated based on the context of user's 201 actions combined with theproductivity and security context in which the workspace will operate.The productivity and security targets may also be based on user's 201behavioral analytics, IHS 100 telemetry and/or environmental information(e.g., collected via sensors 112). In some cases, at 205, a localmanagement agent operating on IHS 100 may calculate initial security andproductivity targets based upon the collected security and productivitycontext. In other cases, remote workspace orchestration service 206 maycalculate security and productivity targets.

As used herein, the term “security target” generally refers to theattack surface presented by a workspace that is created and operatedbased on a workspace definition, while the term “productivity target”generally refers to the productivity characteristics of a particularworkspace definition. Examples of a productivity target include, but arenot limited to: type of data or data source available to user 201,minimum latency of a workspace, etc. Conversely, attributes that may beused to characterize a security target may include, but are not limitedto: a minimum security score for a workspace, a minimum trust score ofIHS 100, authentication requirements for user 201 (e.g., how manyauthentication factors are required, frequency of re-authentication),minimum level of trust in the network utilized by a workspace, requiredisolation of a workspace from IHS 100, the ability to access browserwithin a workspace, the ability to transfer data between workspaces, theability to extend a workspace, etc.

Moreover, the term “workspace definition” generally refers to acollection of attributes that describe aspects a workspace that may beassembled, created, and deployed in a manner that satisfies a securitytarget (i.e., the definition presents an attack surface that presents anacceptable level of risk) and a productivity target (e.g., data access,access requirements, upper limits on latency, etc.) in light of thesecurity context (e.g., location, patch level, threat information,network connectivity, etc.) and the productivity context (e.g.,available device type and performance, network speed, etc.) in which theworkspace is to be deployed. A workspace definition may enable fluidityof migration of an instantiated workspace, since the definition supportsthe ability for a workspace to be assembled on any target OS or IHS thatis configured for operation with the workspace orchestration service206.

In describing capabilities and constraints of a workspace, a workspacedefinition 208 may prescribe one or more of: authentication requirementsfor user 201, containment and/or isolation of the workspace (e.g., localapplication, sandbox, docker container, progressive web application or“PWA,” Virtual Desktop Infrastructure “VDI,” etc.), primary applicationsthat can be executed in the defined containment of the workspace toenable user 201 to be productive with one or more data sources,additional applications that enhance productivity, security componentsthat reduce the scope of the security target presented by theproductivity environment (DELL DATA GUARDIAN from DELL TECHNOLOGIESINC., an anti-virus, etc.), the data sources to be accessed andrequirements for routing that data to and from the workspace containment(e.g., use of VPN, minimum encryption strength), workspace capabilitiesto independently attach other resources; etc.

In some implementations, workspace definitions may be based at least inpart on static policies or rules defined, for example, by anenterprise's Information Technology (IT) Decision Maker (ITDM). In someimplementations, static rules may be combined and improved upon bymachine learning (ML) and/or artificial intelligence (AI) algorithmsthat evaluate historical productivity and security data collected asworkspaces are life cycled. In this manner, rules may be dynamicallymodified over time to generate improved workspace definitions. If it isdetermined, for instance, that a user dynamically adds a text editorevery time he uses MICROSOFT VISUAL STUDIO from MICROSOFT CORPORATION,then workspace orchestration service 206 may autonomously add thatapplication to the default workspace definition for that user.

Still with respect to FIG. 2 , during orchestration 200B, the initialsecurity and productivity targets are processed and/or reconciledagainst resources, device capabilities, and cloud services available,etc., to produce a workspace definition at 208. As described, aworkspace definition may specify capabilities and constraints of aworkspace, such as: runtime security requirements of the workspacecontainment (e.g., such as isolation from the OS of IHS 100 or fromcertain hardware of IHS 100), the use of reference measurements toattest to the integrity of the workspace once running, applications tobe provided for operation within the workspace, aggregation of resourcesavailable via the workspace, access configurations (e.g., virtualprivate network or “VPN”), etc.

The initial workspace definition may then be utilized by automationengine 302 of workspace orchestration service 206 to coordinate assembly209 and instantiation 210 of a workspace on an appropriateplatform—e.g., on the cloud or on IHS 201—based on the security andproductivity contexts in which the workspace will operate. In caseswhere a workspace is cloud-hosted, automation engine 302 may assembleand instantiate a remote workspace that may be accessed via a secureconnection established via a web browser or other web-based componentoperating on IHS 100. In some embodiments, automation engine 302 mayresolve configuration conflicts between a workspace definition and theuser's inputs in the operation of a workspace.

The instantiated workspace is operated by user 201 at 211, and newproductivity and security context information related to the behavior oruse of data is generated at 212. This operation of a workspace mayresult in a change or new classification of data based upon what user201 has done, accessed, and/or created, thus resulting in a change tothe security context of the workspace. To the extent the user'sbehavioral analytics, device telemetry, and/or the environment haschanged to a quantifiable degree, these changes in security context mayserve as additional input for a reevaluation of the security andperformance targets at 207 by automation engine 302. Additionally, oralternatively, new workspace context, security target, and/orproductivity target may be now measured against the initial targets, andthe result may cause automation engine 302 to produce a new workspacedefinition at 208, if appropriate.

Particularly, if an instantiated workspace has parameters that falloutside of the range of the target indexes such that a differencebetween additional or updated context information and the initial orprevious context information is scored below a threshold value,automation engine 302 may process the assembly of modifications to anexisting workspace and deploy such modifications at 210. Conversely, ifthe difference between the additional or updated context information andthe initial or previous context information is scored above a thresholdvalue, automation engine 302 may generate a new workspace at 210.Session data metadata and context may be preserved by data aggregationengine 336, and session data may be restored as applicable.

Additionally, or alternatively, method 200 may terminate or retire theinitial or previous workspace at 213, as part of termination phase 200C.In some cases, user action may initiate the termination process (e.g.,user 201 closes application or browser accessing data) and/ortermination may take place automatically as part of an adjustment inworkspace definition (e.g., the isolated environment is instructed toterminate by automation engine 302). Still as part of termination phase200C, workspace resources of IHS 100 and/or at workspace orchestrationservice 206 may be released.

As such, in various embodiments, method 200 enables secure userproductivity even when a workspace operates on an IHS or cloud platformthat is not under direct management. Method 200 also provides fordynamic or adaptive configurations and policies allowing for the bestpossible user experience while maintaining appropriate level ofsecurity. In some cases, the definition of a productivity environmentand access requirements may be selected based upon productivity andsecurity dependencies and targets, and the definition of capabilitiesrelated to the workspace may be adaptive in nature. Particularly,workspace definition attributes may be dynamically selected based uponhistorical productivity and security information, based upon eachindividual user or group's behavior.

FIGS. 3A and 3B show a diagram of an example of system components 300Aand 300B (collectively referred to as “system 300”) configured tomodernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. Particularly, system 300 may include one or moreIHSs remotely located and/or networked having program instructionsstored thereon that, upon execution, cause the one or more IHSs toperform various workspace orchestration operations described herein,including, but not limited to: the dynamic evaluation of security andproductivity targets based upon updated context information receivedfrom IHS 100, the calculation of risk scores and other productivity andsecurity metrics based on ongoing collection of context information, thegeneration of workspace definitions, and the assembly of one or morefiles or policies that enable the instantiation of a workspace inaccordance with a workspace definition at a cloud service and/or IHS100.

System 300 may include program instructions that, upon execution, causeIHS 100 to perform various local management operations described herein,including, but not limited to, the collection of productivity andsecurity context information, the calculation of productivity scoresand/or risk scores, the instantiation, execution, and modification of aworkspace based upon files, definitions, or policies, such as workspacedefinitions.

Components 300A and 300B of system 300 may be coupled to and/or incommunication with each other via any suitable network technology and/orprotocol, which allows workspace orchestration service 206 to beremotely provided with respect to local management agent 332. Asdescribed with regard to FIG. 1 , an IHS according to embodiments mayinclude a component such as a trusted controller that may supportcertain secure out-of-band communications that are independent from theOS of IHS 100. In some embodiments, such a trusted controller may beconfigured to support deployment and operation of local management agent332 and/or to report changes in context to workspace orchestrationservice 206.

As illustrated in system component 300A of FIG. 3A, workspaceorchestration service 206 may include a number of sub-components thatsupport deployment and ongoing evaluation and adaptation of workspaceson IHS 100. Embodiments of workspace orchestration service 206 mayinclude systems that may support: web services 306, manufacturerintegration 317, and analytics 323. Moreover, web services 306 maycomprise application services 301 and user interface (UI) and automationservices 302.

Analytics services 323 may be configured to receive and process contextinformation from IHS 100, both during initial configuration of aworkspace and in ongoing support of workspaces, and to provide thatinformation, along with any analytics generated, to context logic 303 ofapplication services 301. Based on information collected during thedeployment and ongoing support of workspaces, support assistanceintelligence engine (SATE) 324 may be configured to generate and/oranalyze technical support information (e.g., updates, errors, supportlogs, etc.) for use in diagnosing and repairing workspace issues.Workspace insights and telemetry engine 325 may be configured to analyzeand/or produce device-centric, historical, and behavior-based data(e.g., hardware measurements, use of features, settings, etc.) resultingfrom the operation of workspaces. Workspace intelligence module 326 mayinclude any suitable intelligence engine for processing and evaluatingcontext data in order to identify patterns and tendencies in theoperation of workspaces and in the adaptation of workspaces based oncontext changes.

Application services 306 system of workspace orchestration service 206includes UI and automation services 302 system that may include contextlogic or engine 303, classification policy 304, and condition controlmodule or engine 305. Context logic or engine 303 may support processingof context information in making risk assessments (e.g., evaluating therisk associated requests by the user against the context of the user'sbehavior, history of the user's IHS, capabilities of the user's IHS, andenvironmental conditions). For instance, security context informationcollected by IHS 100 may be provided to workspace orchestration service206 where it may be used, such as by context logic 303, to calculate arisk score associated with a request for use of a managed data sourceand/or application. Classification policy 304 may include administratorand machine-learning defined policies describing risk classificationsassociated with different security contexts, such as riskclassifications for specific data, locations, environments, IHSs,logical environments, or user actions (e.g., use of high-risk datarequires use of a workspace definition suitable for use with a riskscore above a specific value). Condition control module or engine 305may include intelligence providing automated decision making forappropriately aligning risk and context. In some cases, conditioncontrol module or engine 305 may dynamically deploy a solution toaddress any detected misalignment of risk and context. For instance,upon requesting access to a highly classified data source that resultsin a significant increase in risk score, the condition control enginemay select workspace definition modifications that implement securityprocedures that are suitable for the higher risk score.

Application services 301 may include a group of web services 306 calledon by UI and automation services 302 to support various aspects of theorchestration of workspaces. Particularly, web services 306 may includeapplication and workspace services 307 that may assemble and packageapplications for deployment in a workspace (e.g., an “.msix” filepackaged and deployed to a MICROSOFT HYPER-V container). In someembodiments, a workspace definition may be used to specify whether auser will be provided access to an application in this manner. Webservices 306 may also include a tenant subscription module 308, thatperforms dynamic configuration of an IHS and deployment of the describedworkspace orchestration services at the point-of-sale (POS) of an IHS. Alicense tracking module 309 may be used to maintain and track licenseinformation for software, services, and IHSs. An access control module310 may provide top level access controls used in controlling access todata and applications by authorized users. A Unified Endpoint Management(UEM) module 311 may be configured to support the describedorchestration of workspaces on various different IHSs that may beutilized by a particular user.

Web services 306 that may be used in support of workspaces may furtherinclude resource provisioning services 312 for configuring an IHS orworkspace with secrets/credentials necessary to access specificresources (e.g., credentials for use of VPNs, networks, data storagerepositories, workspace encryption, workspace attestation, andworkspace-to-device anchoring). In some cases, resource provisioningservices 312 may include secrets provisioned as part of a trustedassembly process of IHS 100 and, in some instances, associated with aunique identifier 348 of the IHS 100. Web services 306 may also includean authorization/token module that provides identity functions and mayconnect to various authentication sources, such as, for example, ActiveDirectory. Endpoint registration module 314 may be configured toregister IHSs and/or workspaces with management service that tracks theuse of the described workspace orchestration. In some scenarios, adirectory services 315 module may be configured to provide activedirectory services (e.g., AZURE ACTIVE DIRECTORY from MICROSOFT). Deviceconfiguration services 316 enable central configuration, monitoring,managing, and optimization of workspaces that in certain contexts mayoperate remotely from an IHS and may only present the user of the IHSwith an image of the workspace output. In cooperation with resourceprovisioning services 312, device configuration services 316 may alsohandle secret creation and IHS configuration, and it some cases, may beout-of-band capable and handle selected operations to the endpoint.

Still referring to FIG. 3A, manufacturer integration components 317communicate with application services 301 and client IHS 100 to providefeatures that are usable during workspace evaluation and instantiation,where these features are based upon information available to themanufacturer of client IHS 100. For instance, certificate authority 318may include an entity that issues digital certificates that may be usedin validating the authenticity and integrity of the hardware of IHS 100.Identity service module or engine 319 may be configured to manage theuser's or owner's identity as well as brokering identification for useof customer directory 322. Order entitlement module or engine 320 may beresponsible for managing the entitlements purchased as well as theassociated issued certificates signed by 318. Ownership repository 321may manage user entitlements associated with IHSs and their ownershipand may provide support for users transferring ownership of an IHS andconveying the entitlements associated with that IHS. In certainscenarios, ownership repository 321 may use this transfer of ownershipto decommission the secrets associated with the entitlements embedded inthe IHS. Customer directory 322 may be configured to authenticate andauthorize all users and IHSs in a network, such as assigning andenforcing security policies for all IHSs and installing or updatingsoftware (in some cases, customer directory 322 may work in cooperationand/or may be the same as directory services 315).

Referring now to IHS 100 of FIG. 3B, in some embodiments, IHS 100 may beconfigured to operate local management agent 332 that may run within asecure execution environment 345 hosted by trusted controller 341, suchas trusted controller 115 of FIG. 1 . In other embodiments, localmanagement agent 332 may operate as a trusted and attestable process ofthe OS of IHS 100. In some embodiments, local management agent 332 mayinclude a workspace engine suitable for instantiating and managing theoperation of one or more workspaces 331A-N on IHS 100. As described, thecapabilities of a workspace may be modified based on changes in theproductivity and security contexts in which the workspace is operating.Accordingly, the workload(s) in each of workspaces 331A-N may be hostedin a public cloud, a private cloud, a specific server, or locally hostedon IHS 100, depending on the context in which the workspace isoperating. These allocations of workspace computing for each particularworkspace 331A-N may be prescribed by the workspace definition that isused to build and operate each workspace. As described, the workspacedefinition may be created by workspace orchestration service 206 basedupon context information provided by IHS 100, security targets for eachworkspace 331A-N, and productivity targets for each workspace 331A-N.

In some embodiments, local management agent 332 may be configured tohost, launch, and/or execute a workspace hub 327 that provides a launchpoint 203 by which user's initiate workspaces through the selection ofmanaged data and resources. In various embodiments, launch point 203 maybe an agent, application, special-purpose workspace or web portal theprovides an interface by which a user may select from an aggregatedcollection of data sources, applications, calendars, messages or othermanaged information or resources that are available to the user of IHS100 via operation of a workspace as described herein. In variousembodiments, the launch point 203 may be provided in the form fortextual, graphical and/or audio user interfaces that allow a user of IHS100 to select available data and/or resources. In some embodiments,workspace hub 327 may utilize a local environment management module 328in providing the workspace interface that is presented to the user onIHS 100 and doing so in a consistent manner across workspaces 331A-N.Workspace hub 327 may also include a local intelligence logic or engine329 used to support modeling the use of IHS 100 in order to improvecharacterization of the actual risk associated with a risk context. Userauthentication and access control operations may be performed by a localidentify module 330 that may interface with trusted controller 341 inproviding user authentication.

In some cases, each instantiated workspace 331A-N may be an environmentthat provides a user with access to requested data or applications,where the environment may be isolated in varying degrees from thehardware and software of IHS 100 based on the security context andproductivity context in which each workspace 331A-N is operating. Insome instances, the selection of a data source or resource that areavailable to user via launch point 203 may result in launching a newworkspace. For instance, if a user launches a browser through selectionof an icon displayed by launch point 203, a new workspace may be createdand launched according to a workspace definition that has been selectedfor providing the user access to a web browser in the security andproductivity contexts in which the request has been made. In a scenariowhere the user double clicks on a confidential presentation fileavailable from a data source that is provided by launch point 203, anadditional workspace may be instantiated with a presentation applicationproviding access to the requested presentation file, where this newworkspace is created based on a workspace definition that providedappropriate security for access to the confidential presentation). Inother instances, a selection of the presentation file by a user mayresult in the presentation being made available through the existingworkspace, in some cases using the existing workspace definition and, inother cases, using a workspace definition that has been modified tosupport the requested access to the confidential presentation file.

Although workspaces 331A-N supported by IHS 330B may each be isolated tovarying degrees from the hardware and/or software of IHS 100 and fromeach other, a user of IHS 330B may expect to be able to operate themultiple workspaces 331A-N in a manner that allows content to betransferred between the different workspaces 331A-N. For instance, auser may select a portion of the data displayed in workspace 331A andutilize OS or other workspace functions to copy the data for copying toworkspace 331B.

In various embodiments, local management agent 332 may operate in fullor in part on secure platform 345 hosted by trusted controller 341 thatoperates independent from the OS of IHS 100. In some embodiments, all orpart of local management agent 332 may operate as trusted components ofthe OS of IHS 100. To execute the various operations described herein,local management agent 332 may include command monitor 334 configured toprovide instrumentation to receive commands from workspace orchestrationservice 206 and thus enable access to IHS 100. Local management agent332 may also include telemetry module 335 that may be configured forcommunicating collected information to workspace orchestration service206, including reporting changes in context that may warrant adjustmentsto workspaces 331A-N. Data aggregator 336 may track all of the datasource and other resources (e.g., applications, local or cloud-basedservices) that may be provided to the user via a workspace.

Local management agent 332 may utilize resource manager module 337 thatis configured to manage access to data, network configuration, such asfor VPNs and network access, identity information, access control, andresource provisioning services. Security module 338 may be configured toprovide various security services. BIOS interface 339 may provide asecure BIOS interface used for accessing and managing credentials insecure object storage. BIOS analytics module 340 may be configured toperform forensic services for BIOS telemetry and health assessments.Persistence module 346 may be configured to support persistence ofapplications entitled at a POS or assigned by administrators andsupported with required license tracking. Workspace attestation module333 may provide a platform centric service layer on top of a containerengine provided by local management agent 332 and may be used to measureand attest workspaces 331A-N in any suitable manner defined ororchestrated by condition control 305.

As part of secure platform 345, native management module 347 may beconfigured to enable out-of-band management interface with workspaceorchestration service 206, where this OOB interface operates independentform the OS of IHS 100. In some embodiments, the OOB managementinterface supported by native management module 347 may be utilized bythe device configuration services 316 of the workspace orchestrationservice to access the secure platform services 345 of IHS 100.

Digital device ID module 348 may provide a unique, un-spoofable,cryptographically bound identifier. In embodiments supporting a secureplatform 345, secure embedded controller 341 may be a hardened hardwaremodule that may include a root of trust module 342 configured as atrusted data store and, in some cases for cryptographic processing, thatmay be trusted within a cryptographic system. A device attestationservice 343 may be configured to perform device assurance and trustservices (e.g., secure BIOS and secure boot, etc.). A secure objectstore 344 may be provided that is configured to lock and access keys,hashes, and/or other secrets in an EC and/or TPM.

In some scenarios, IHS 100 may be provisioned by a manufacturer thatalso controls manufacturer integration components 317, workspaceattestation module 333 may operate in conjunction with secure objectstore 342, authenticated BIOS module 339, and/or digital device identitymodule 348, etc., to further secure and/or control productivity featuresavailable in any of workspaces 331A-N based upon hardware devices andsettings unique to that IHS and/or designed specifically by thatmanufacturer.

To further illustrate how the systems and methods described hereinoperate to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management in anenterprise productivity ecosystem, three non-limiting use-cases orexamples are discussed in turn below.

Use-Case A

In use-case A, a given user may request access to a protected datasource on the enterprise's premise using a corporate-owned and imagednotebook, such configured as described with regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1and client IHS 100 of FIG. 3B.

In response to the request, a local management agent 332 operating onthe user's notebook retrieves information describing the context andcalculates security and productivity targets based on the determinedcontext. In this use-case, the local management agent may have beeninstalled by IT, and it may be running in the background as a service.The confidential data may be associated with the local management agenton the local machine, based on file classification (e.g., filemetadata/type/properties/permissions, folder location, encrypted region,etc.). Moreover, the local management agent may continuously collectcontext information and send it to the orchestration service for use inscoring the risk and productivity of the workspace (this may also bedone at the time of the user's access request or indication of intent).

When the user selects the confidential data, such as via a selection viathe OS of the notebook, the local management agent notifies theworkspace orchestration service of the request and for a workspacedefinition for a workspace by which the user may be provided access tothe confidential data.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “2,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also given as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 1 (safe locale); userpersona: 1 (known high-confidence in a reasonably sophisticated userclassification—a user whom historically does not click on phishingemails); network risk: 1 (low risk because of on premise, wiredconnection detected); device risk: 1 (high level of control because ofcorporate owned/managed platform, known versions, security featuresenabled, etc.); regulatory: 1 (based on user, data, locationcombinations—e.g., No restrictions with respect to General DataProtection Regulation or “GDPR,” Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act “HIPAA,” Payment Card Industry “PCI,” technologyexport, etc.); and data type: 8 (a confidential datafile is beingrequested).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “9,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the following contextinformation or inputs, each of which is also given as a resource metricbased upon a selected policy: locale: 10 (office); user persona: 9 (a“skilled” classification based upon advanced compute tasks, proficiency,and/or speed); network speed/latency: 10 (fast, wired, Gigabit Ethernet,or direct to internal network); device performance: 8 (fast, expensiveCPU, memory, graphics, but storage only needs—e.g., <10 GB); and datatype: 10 (the local, confidential file is easy to read/write with lowlatency and high performance on local storage).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, the security target may be deemed to have a value of“1” based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads,needs, or demands on security controls and containment features that mayinclude: threat monitoring: 1 (low demand); threat detection: 1 (lowdemand); threat analytics: 1 (low demand); threat response: 1 (lowdemand); storage confidentiality: 2 (low); storage integrity: 2 (low);network confidentiality: 1 (low); network integrity: 1 (low); memoryconfidentiality: 1 (low); memory integrity: 1 (low); displayconfidentiality: 1 (low); display integrity: 1 (low); userauthentication: 1 (low, basic password is fine, non-multifactorauthentication or “MFA,” no session expiration); IT administrator scope:1 (administrator manages remotely but does not need heavy remediationsoftware; and regulatory compliance: 1 (no GDPR, No HIPAA, no PCI, notech export restriction, etc.).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “9” (defining a high-quality, responsive user experience) basedupon a combination of attribute values representing productivityrequirements as follows: local storage: 7 (partial hard drive control,some storage reserved for IT load); CPU access: 10 (unlimited); localgraphics: 10 (unlimited); and application stack: 10 (can useapplications, install applications that the user needs, give themadministrator rights, etc.).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and the local management agent may assemble theworkspace and instantiate it for the user. For example, the localmanagement agent may receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.)from the orchestration service, and it may parse the file to implementsecurity risk controls such as: threat monitoring: 1 (local managementagent does not install threat, detection, and response or “TDR”software); threat detection: 1 (local management agent does not installTDR software); threat analytics: 1 (orchestration does not need togather detailed telemetry from the system, OS will not be enrolled inlogging); threat response: 1 (local management agent does not installsecurity threat response agent); storage confidentiality: 2 (localmanagement agent deploys a local file-system encryption product that theuser can optionally enable on specific files as needed with right-clickcontext menus); storage integrity: 2; network confidentiality: 1 (localmanagement agent confirms basic firewall configuration is correct—e.g.,IT GPO-controlled); network integrity: 1; memory confidentiality: 1(local management agent confirms configuration—e.g., No SGX, TXT, orcontainer/sandbox software deployed); memory integrity: 1; displayconfidentiality: 1 (local management agent confirms graphics driversinstalled, privacy screen and camera optionally managed by user);display integrity: 1; user authentication: 1 (local agent confirms basicGPO password rules are configured, and met by user—e.g., number ofcharacters, no session expiration, etc.); IT administrator scope: 1(local agent runs with system privilege, confirms IT admin accounts arelisted in local admin user group—e.g., per GPO); and regulatorycompliance: 1 (local agent does not install any compliance assistancesoftware).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedlocal confidential file, and the user may begin working in a newlycreated workspace.

Use-Case B

In use-case B, a user may request access to a confidential datafilewhile at a coffee shop using an open public network and anIT-managed/owned PC, such configured as described with regard to IHS 100of FIG. 1 and client IHS 100 of FIG. 3B.

First, a local management agent (332) executed by client IHS 100retrieves the requested context and calculates security and productivityscores based on context. In this use-case, the local management agentmay have been installed by IT, and it may be running in the backgroundas a service. The confidential data may kept on a shared IT-managednetwork resource on-premises (e.g., back in a main corporate office),and the local management agent may be responsible for monitoring whenthis data path is requested by the user (e.g., the user hits a specificURL, IP, etc.). Moreover, the local management agent may continuouslycollect all context and send it to the workspace orchestration serviceto assist in scoring processes later (this may also be done at the timeof the user's access request or indication of intent, rather than acontinuous collection).

When the user selects the desired confidential datafile, client IHS100's OS calls the local management agent associated with the path tothe confidential datafile and calls back to a remote workspaceorchestration service (206) to request a workspace definition.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “4,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also given as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 5 (public, safe country);user persona: 5 (new user, classification data does not exist yet);network risk: 5 (medium, public but common location, wireless connectiondetected); device risk: 1 (high level of control, corporateowned/managed platform, known versions, security features enabled,etc.); and regulatory: 1 (based on user, data, locationcombinations—e.g., no restrictions with respect to General DataProtection Regulation or “GDPR,” Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act “HIPAA,” Payment Card Industry “PCI,” technologyexport, etc.).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “5,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon context information orinputs, each of which is also given as a resource metric based upon aselected policy. For instance, security contexts inputs may include:locale: 6 (remote location but in USA major city, in a public area,non-employees are within visual/audio range of device); user persona: 5(unknown confidence “null” classification, uses default onboardingassumptions); network speed/latency: 4 (medium, wireless but AC onshared network); and device performance: 8 (fast, expensive CPU, memory,graphics, but storage only needs˜<10 GB).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, a security target may be deemed to have a value of “4”based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads, needs,or demands on security controls and containment features as follows:threat monitoring: 4 (medium demand); threat detection: 4 (mediumdemand); threat analytics: 4 (medium demand); threat response: 4 (mediumdemand); storage confidentiality: 4 (medium); storage integrity: 9(high); network confidentiality: 5 (medium); network integrity: 2 (low);memory confidentiality: 4 (medium); memory integrity: 8 (high); displayconfidentiality: 7 (medium/high—worried about “shoulder surfers” readingdata from an adjacent seat or table nearby, public location) displayintegrity: 2 (low); user authentication: 4 (medium, two-factorauthentication using a hardware token, session expiration upon sleep,screen lock, or logout); IT administration scope: 3 (administrator canmonitor, manage, and remediate remotely if the user calls them for helpwith IT issues); and regulatory compliance: 1 (no GDPR, No HIPAA, noPCI, no tech export restriction, etc.).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “7” (defining a high-quality, responsive user experience) basedupon a combination of attribute values representing productivityrequirements as follows: local storage: 7 (partial hard drive control,some storage reserved for IT load); CPU access: 10 (unlimited); localgraphics: 10 (unlimited); and application stack: 7 (can useapplications, can install some IT-approved applications that the userneeds, but no administrator rights, because the user cannot be trustedto install only valid/safe productivity software, but can installpre-approved IT applications as needed).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and the local management agent may assemble theworkspace and instantiate it for the user. For example, the localmanagement agent may receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.)from the orchestration service, and it may parse the file to implementsecurity risk controls such as: threat monitoring: 5 (local managementagent installs or confirms prior installation/configuration of TDRsoftware); threat detection: 5 (local management agent installs orconfirms prior installation/configuration of TDR software); threatanalytics: 5 (orchestration confirms telemetry is accessible, OS will beenrolled in logging if not already enrolled); threat response: 2 (localmanagement agent downloads but does not run remote incident responseapplication—preparation in case incident is detected); storageconfidentiality: 5 (local management agent deploys a local containertechnology, such as sandbox, with restricted “save” permissions suchthat the confidential files will not be allowed to save locally on thePC, but can be accessed as long as the session is active in memory);storage integrity: 5; network confidentiality: 5 (local management agentsteps up firewall protections, disabling all unnecessary ports, andestablishes a VPN back to the corporate office for protecting traffic tothe local sandbox); network integrity: 5; memory confidentiality: 5(local management agent configures sandbox container to isolateapplication and data from other applications/threats that may infiltratethe host OS); memory integrity: 5; display confidentiality: 7 (localmanagement agent confirms graphics drivers installed, enforces privacyscreen and uses camera to detect specific onlooker threats); displayintegrity: 7; user authentication: 4 (local agent confirms basic GPOpassword rules are configured, and met by user—e.g., number ofcharacters, no session expiration, etc., but also adds in a requirementfor hardware token to log in and again to establish network); ITadministrator scope: 4 (local agent runs with administrator and remoteaccess privilege, confirms IT admin accounts are listed in local adminuser group—e.g., per GPO); and regulatory compliance: 4 (local agentinstalls state specific rule enforcement or monitoring software).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedlocal confidential file, and the user may begin working in a newlycreated workspace.

Use-Case C

In use-case C, a user may request access to a confidential datafile in aweb hosted remote portal using a browser from Kazakhstan, while at aninternet café with a borrowed/rented PC, such configured as describedwith regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1 and client IHS 100 of FIG. 3B, on anopen WiFi network.

First, a remote workspace orchestration service (332) intercepts theaccess request and evaluates the browser and user context, andcalculates security and productivity scores. In this use-case, there isno local management agent; all that is known is the browser and anytelemetry returned or garnered through the HTTP/S session. Assume, forsake of this example, that the confidential data may kept on a sharedIT-managed network resource on-premises (e.g., back in a main corporateoffice) and that the datafile will remain there with only remoterendering/access privileges. Web-based context may be gathered throughthe browser session or supplied by the user. Moreover, user context mayalso be collected for the workspace orchestration service throughalternate side-channels (e.g., travel calendar information, recent userbilling activity on corporate credit card, phone call logs, and/orlocation data).

When the user selects the desired confidential datafile from the webbrowser, the back-end web server infrastructure calls back to theworkspace orchestration service to request a workspace definition.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “9,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also scored as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 9 (Kazakhstan); userpersona: 1 (user was expected to be there, the timing seems right basedupon past logins, and he has a biometric watch communicator proving heis alive, himself, and located where he says he is—so that IT can alwaystrust him); network risk: 9 (high, public and in a very obscure place);device risk: 9 (zero trust); and regulatory: 8 (based on user, data,location combinations).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “5,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the following contextinformation or inputs, each of which is also given as a resource metricbased upon a selected policy: locale: 3 (internet café device withoutgreat performance); user persona: 9 (known high-confidence and “skilled”classification—advanced compute tasks, proficiency, and speed); networkspeed/latency: 3 (low quality—Wireless G from a long way away); anddevice performance: 3 (have to be able to tolerably browse web pages butbased on what the service believes the capabilities will be, the serviceshould build simple ones).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, a security target may be deemed to have a value of “9”based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads, needs,or demands on security controls and containment features as follows:threat monitoring: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat detection: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat analytics: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat response: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);storage confidentiality: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the serverside); storage integrity: 8; network confidentiality: 10 (high demand,to be handled on the server side); network integrity: 9; memoryconfidentiality: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);memory integrity: 9; display confidentiality: 10 (high, “shouldersurfers” may read datafile from an adjacent seat or table nearby in apublic location); display integrity: 9; user authentication: 10 (high,three-factor authentication using login, hardware token, and biometricsatellite watch—session expiration and refreshes every 30 seconds); ITadministrator scope: 8 (administrator may monitor, manage, and remediateremotely if the user calls them for help or anything unexpectedhappens); and regulatory compliance: 10 (all network traffic is securelymonitored as will the data presented).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “3” (defining a usable secure user experience primarily builtfor consumption and not productivity) based upon a combination ofattribute values representing productivity requirements as follows:local storage: 1 (cache only); CPU access: 3 (build for limitedexpectations); local graphics: 3 (build for limited expectations); andapplication stack: 1 (web browser experience on a kiosk mode device,limited data entry capability, limited read access to need-to-know onlyinformation through VDI rendered kiosk).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and remote cloud web portal (e.g., session theuser logged into through the browser) may assemble the workspace andinstantiate it for the user in the browser. For example, the web portalmay receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.) from theorchestration service, and it may parse the file to implement securityrisk controls such as: threat monitoring: 9 (data center basedmanagement agent installs or confirms prior installation/configurationof TDR software); threat detection: 9 (data center based managementagent installs or confirms prior installation/configuration of TDRsoftware); threat analytics: 9 (orchestration confirms telemetry isaccessible, server hosting web server may be enrolled in logging if notalready enrolled—user behavioral telemetry from side channels may alsobe continuously monitored for suspicious/anomalous activity); threatresponse: 10 (data center-based management agent sets up watchdog timerto kill session automatically without periodic check-ins fromorchestration, user telemetry, and web browser); storageconfidentiality: 9 (data center-based management agent builds aprogressive web application that may be used to display the data througha secure TLS link—the data will be rendered but only the as-neededportions of visualization presented to the user, and nothing can besaved); storage integrity: 10; network confidentiality: 9 (route trafficthrough best effort to secure locations—do not allow anything exceptbitmap renderings through the enforceable network); network integrity:4; memory confidentiality: 9 (web page viewer only—no data leaves thedata center, no confidential input is taken from the rented PC, nokeyboard input is allowed, and all input may be captured from randomizedvirtual keyboard using mouse click coordinates); memory integrity: 8;display confidentiality: 8 (best effort to ensure confidentiality—promptuser at least—adjustable font sizes, but defaults to small fonts,obfuscated text, etc.); display integrity: 2; user authentication: 9(local agent confirms basic password rules are configured, and met byuser—e.g., number of characters, no session expiration, etc., but alsoadds in a requirement for hardware token and biometric, satellite watchto log in and again to establish network, requiring frequentreconfirmation from user); IT administrator scope: 7 (data center-basedremote environment); and regulatory compliance: 8 (local agent does notexist but data center-based agent monitors/blocks data not appropriate).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedrendered data, and the user may begin working in a newly createdworkspace.

FIG. 4 is a diagram of an example of heterogeneous workload environment400 configured to perform the migration of workloads across cloudservices based upon IHS performance. In environment 400, physicalmachine or endpoint 402 may implement IHS 100 and devices 401 mayimplement certain components of IHS 100 such as, for instance, userinput devices 111, sensors 112, optical drive 114, I/O ports 116, etc.

Hypervisor 403 is a software program executed by physical machine orendpoint 402 that creates and runs software-based containers, such assoftware-based container 407, for example. Although hypervisor 403 isshown as a type-1, native, or bare-metal hypervisor (running directly onhardware 402 to manage host OS kernel 404), in other implementationshypervisor 404 may be a type-2 or hosted hypervisor (running on top ofhost OS kernel 404).

To produce and/or manage a first type of workload, hypervisor 403supports host OS kernel 404, which in turn enables native application406 to execute using native binary files and/or library files(bins/libs) 405. To concurrently produce and/or manage a second type ofworkload, host OS kernel 404 also supports the execution ofsoftware-based container 407, where container application 408 executesusing container bin/libs 409. Software-based Container 407 may include,for example, a sandbox instance, Virtual Machine (VM), docker, snap,PWA, VDI, etc.

To concurrently produce and/or manage a third type of workload,hypervisor 403 also enables the execution of hardware-based container410. Within hardware-based container 410, local management agent 332instantiates workspace 331A based on a workspace definition such thatapplication 411 executes using container bin/libs 412 within theconstraints of workspace 331A. In some cases, hardware-based container410 may include a uni-mini kernel engine or the like (e.g., Hyper-V,INTEL Clear Container, etc.). Other types of workloads may also besupported in environment 400.

In some implementations, software-based container 407 may be configuredto execute applications or workloads that do not require a high level ofsecurity, for example, because they are trusted, such as containerapplication 408. Conversely, workspace 331A may be configured to executeapplications or workloads that do require a high level of security, forexample, because they are untrusted, such as application 411, and/orbecause a current context (e.g., user is presently at untrustedgeographical location, IHS 100 is subject to different networkconditions, etc.) matches one or more rules outlined in a policy.Additionally, or alternatively, workspace 331A may be configured toexecute applications or workloads that require an OS kernel differentthan host OS kernel 404.

In some embodiments, when applications are distributed and/or deployedfrom a trusted source, software-based container 407 may be used as theygenerally have less overhead and provide higher containerizedapplication density. Conversely, when applications are distributedand/or deployed from an untrusted source, hardware-based (hypervisorisolated) workspace 331A may be used, despite presenting a higheroverhead, to the extent it provides better isolation or security.

Software-based container 407 shares the kernel of host OS 404 and UEFIservices, but access is restricted based on the container's userprivileges. Hardware-based container 410 and/or workspace 311A may havea separate instance of OS and UEFI services. In both cases, containers407 and 410 serve to isolate applications 408 and 411 from host OSkernel 404 and other applications.

In various embodiments, each of a plurality of end users such as, forexample, employees of an organization, may operate one or more clientIHSs or endpoints, each client IHS having a different hardwareconfiguration and/or resources. Moreover, the organization may providethe plurality of users with one or more time and/or volume subscriptionsor licenses to one or more cloud computing services for additionalcompute infrastructure. Examples of cloud computing services usable withsystems and methods described herein may include, but are not limitedto: Software as a Services (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),and Platform as a Service (PaaS), among others.

As part of normal workspace instantiation and usage, successiveorchestration operations between workspace orchestration service 206 andworkspace 331 may continuously or periodically deploy workspaceinstances and monitor security and productivity context against securityand risk targets. In many situations, however, certain types of securityattacks may be capable of manipulating instantiation, configuration,and/or modification operations, thus resulting in incorrectly deployedworkspaces and/or spoofed information, which weakens the trustrelationship between orchestration service 206 and workspace 331.

Particularly in the case of Person-in-the-Middle attacks, traditionalIndicators-of-Attack (IoA) detection techniques at either end of thetransport can be difficult to implement, as communications often appearto be intact if the attacker competently spoofs orchestration service206 and/or workspace 331. Moreover, if such an attacker discovers theyare being monitored, they may attempt to evade detection by temporarilyand/or occasionally suspending malicious activity. Accordingly, it isimportant to detect a Person-in-the-Middle attack using techniques thatcannot be detected by the attacker.

To address these, and other concerns, systems and methods describedherein may monitor characteristics (e.g., timing, sequence, etc.) oforchestration operations and/or measurements communicated betweenorchestration service 206 (or a set of orchestration services) andworkspace 331 in the form of workspace orchestration logs. These systemsand methods may then detect anomalies using one or more workspaceorchestration logs.

For example, if the timing of one or more corresponding entries in twoworkspace orchestration logs, one from perspective of orchestrationservice 206 and another from the perspective of workspace 331, isdisproportional or dissimilar (e.g., on a continuous sliding windowbasis), such an anomaly may be used an indicator that the transport isbeing intercepted or manipulated by a third-party sitting betweenorchestration service 206 and workspace 331.

In some cases, orchestrator measurements may be used as a reference.Additionally, or alternatively, baselines and comparisons across anenterprise's global distribution of workspaces and/or orchestrators (ortest workspaces and reference orchestrators) may be used to increase theconfidence of detection of attack.

Particularly, a common use case for a modern workspace is one whereworkspace instances are deployed across multiple devices in anorganization. Workspace instantiation on a given IHS may fail due tocorruption or a security attack. When an attacker compromises aninstance of a workspace, systems and methods described herein mayidentify that instance before the infection spreads from one IHS toanother in a network.

For instance, orchestration service 206 may maintain a set of trustedgolden contextual or telemetry measurements for each workspacedefinition. A trusted side channel monitoring agent (e.g., LocalManagement Agent 332) on an IHS may monitor and log selected events in aworkspace's lifecycle, such as, for example: workspace instantiationtime, timestamp and sequence of instantiation operations, instantiationcount, initial memory and network signature, delay between instantiationoperations, calculation of security scores, calculation of productivityscores, etc., and these events may be recorded in a workspaceorchestration log. Examples of workspace telemetry or contextualinformation that may also be included in a workspace orchestration loginclude, but are not limited to: thermal measurements, acousticmeasurements, workspace memory utilization, workspace network signature,communication channel latency (delay/delta), etc.

Orchestration service 206 may collect verified measurements from allworkspace instances of a given workspace definition running in aselected environment, and it may create golden measurements from thiscollection (valid workspace instantiation measurements should be same,with a small delta). In some cases, golden measurements of trusted logsmay be averaged for each workspace definition and each type of IHS(e.g., model, form-factor, etc.). For each workspace definition file,orchestration service 206 may maintain different set of goldenmeasurements used for comparison.

If a workspace instance is compromised or corrupted, measurements in theworkspace orchestration log for that instance differ from the goldenmeasurements. If the difference meets a selected threshold value, it beconsidered either as an indicator of attack or workspace corruption.Automated mitigation actions may include isolating the IHS andperforming further analysis for root cause of the measurement deviation.

FIG. 5 is a diagram of an example of method 500 for detecting securityattacks using workspace orchestration logs. Specifically, workspaceorchestration service 206 is in communication with workspace 331 (notshown) instantiated by IHS 100. In operation, workspace orchestrationservice 206 and IHS 100 may exchange workspace orchestration commandsand/or responses in a particular sequence.

The sequence and timing of operations, commands, and/or responses may berecorded by IHS 100 in workspace orchestration log 503 and byorchestration service 206 in workspace orchestration log 504. As such,orchestration service 206 may measure command/response sequence timingas sent/received at orchestration service 206, whereas IHS 100 maymeasure command/response sequence timing as sent/received at IHS 100.

At 501, IHS 100 may send its workspace orchestration log 503 toorchestration service 206 for comparison against workspace orchestrationlog 504. Additionally, or alternatively, at 502 IHS 100 may sendtelemetry or contextual measurements 502 also stored in workspaceorchestration log 503 (or in a separate measurement log), toorchestration service 206.

Orchestration service 206 may be configured to compare the differentlogs, for example, to determine whether corresponding events, timing,and/or values are within acceptable thresholds. For example,orchestration service 206 may check for proportionality, linearity,and/or similarity across corresponding log events, using selectedthresholds, to calculate a confidence value.

Additionally, or alternatively, orchestration service 206 may weighttelemetry or contextual measurements against existing measurementbaselines. This process may be repeated continuously to build a slidingwindow moving average of confidence against time. If the average headsdown for an extended period, that may be indicative of a securityattack, such as a Person-in-the-Middle attack, or the like.

FIG. 6 is a diagram of an example of method 600 for detecting securityattacks using parallel workspace orchestration services 206A and 206B.In this implementation, each of parallel workspace orchestrationservices 206A and 206B may be like service 206, but each may be locatedin a different geographical region 601 and 602 (e.g., differentcontinents, countries, states, etc.), and each may maintain its ownworkspace orchestration logs 604 and 606, with respect to the sameworkspace 331 instantiated by IHS 100, respectively. Meanwhile, IHS 100may maintain first workspace orchestration log 603 for sequences ofevents and/or measurements pertaining to its communications withworkspace orchestration service 206A, and it may also maintain secondworkspace orchestration log 605 for sequences of events and/ormeasurements pertaining to its communications with workspaceorchestration service 206B.

Person-in-the-Middle attacker 607 may cause a discrepancy (e.g., ininstantiation step timings, context measurements, etc.) to appearbetween workspace orchestration logs 605 and 606, and the samediscrepancy is not present between logs 603 and 604. Accordingly,orchestration services 206A and 206B may communicate with each other anddetermine, based upon the magnitude of such a discrepancy, that there iscorresponding degree of confidence that attacker 607 is present betweenIHS 100 and orchestration service 206B.

In some cases, orchestration service 206B may, upon detecting thepossibility of attacker 607, handoff a workspace instantiated by IHS 100to orchestration service 206A via workspace migration operation. If thediscrepancy disappears after the migration, that determination may beused to increase the confidence of and/or to confirm the attack.

FIG. 7 is a diagram of an example of method 700 for detecting securityattacks using fleet baselines. As shown, orchestration service 206 mayreceive workspace orchestration logs 704-706 from IHSs 100A-Cdistributed across different geographic locations 701-703. Eachorchestration log 704-706 may include telemetry and/or contextualmeasurements recorded during instantiation and use of a respectiveinstance of a workspace creased based upon a same workspace definition.

As such, orchestration service 206 may use orchestration logs 704-706 toproduce golden measurements (e.g., based on averages) and/or toestablish regional norms. Moreover, mesh connections across workspacesmay also facilitate peer-to-peer measurement across all workspaces.Variations may indicate changes in overall context that may be factoredinto each IHS measurement.

In some cases, a workspace instantiation process may occur with unusualfrequency, for example, at IHS 100A, due to corruption of workspacedefinition file or a security attack (e.g., a Denial-of-Service attackintended to keep the workspace offline, or repeated attempts to attack aworkspace). This may cause the workspace to be re-created/reset oftenwithin a period of time in order to maintain the productivity andsecurity score.

To address this, orchestration service 206 may receive workspaceorchestration logs from each of IHSs 100A-C, such that each log includesan instantiation time and event. For example, for a workspace definitionfile X, orchestration service 206 may maintain logs from multiple IHSsin a database. With this data, orchestration service 206 may identify anunusually large number of log files that are generated at a given IHSwhen the workspace is instantiated.

If a workspace is corrupt or under attack, the workspace instantiationmay fail. However, if workspace instantiation succeeds, the workspacemay still reset and/or regenerate often enough to maintain theproductivity score (that is, to keep the user productive). This resultsin creation of large number of passing (or clean, good) logs at the IHS,which orchestration service 206 may identify as an indicator of attackor workspace corruption. In this case, mitigation or responsive actionsmay include isolating the IHS and performing further analysis for rootcause of the suspicious instantiation behavior. This technique may beparticularly useful to detect any security attacks when all otherindicators of attack fail to detect anomalous workspace instantiationbehavior.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart of an example of method 800 for detecting securityattacks using redundant communication channels. Particularly, redundantcommunication channels 801-803 (e.g., in-band, out of band, unique IPaddresses, VPN, etc.) between IHS 100 and orchestration service 206 maybe used to send the same workspace orchestration logs. In this case, theinformation (e.g., sequence of events, timing of events, measurements,etc.) of log(s) 804 matches log(s) 805 within selected thresholds.However, a discrepancy between information in log 806 and log 807 due toattacker 808 in a redundant channel may be used as an indication of asecurity attack over that channel.

FIG. 9 is a diagram of an example of method 900 for detecting securityattacks using redundant workspaces. As shown, redundant or mirrorworkspaces may be instantiated in IHSs 100A and 100B under control oforchestration service 206. Orchestration service 206 may determine thata discrepancy between sequences of events, timing of events, and/ormeasurements recorded in measurements logs 903 and 904 does not existbetween logs 901 and 902, and it may identify the presence of attacker905 based upon that determination. Because the redundant workspaces maybe instantiated in parallel, this technique may allow live comparison ofinstantiation step timings or the like.

As such, systems and methods described herein may be used to benchmarkand to compare workspace instantiation and response performancesimilarities and proportionalities to use as indicators of compromise.The various quality-of-service (QoS) techniques described above andusable to discover Person-in-the-Middle attacks may be combined toleverage redundant channels and/or redundant mirror workspaceinstantiation which are uniquely available in a dynamic workspaceorchestration process, where the architecture intentionally buildsredundant resources for fast user context swapping.

Accordingly, these systems and methods may facilitate the detection of acompromised workspace instance in the environment based, at least inpart, upon the creation of trusted logs of workspace instantiationevents on an IHS, and by comparing these local logs against the goldenmeasurement logs maintained by the remote orchestrator for differenttypes of IHS. Moreover, the systems and methods described herein maydetect a compromised or corrupt workspace instance based on the unusualfrequency of passing log generation during the instantiation phases ofthe workspace lifecycle. These systems and methods have the uniqueability to maintain metadata to track and establish patterns acrossmultiple iterations of passing workspace instantiation logs, whichnon-orchestrated workspaces cannot accomplish alone.

It should be understood that various operations described herein may beimplemented in software executed by processing circuitry, hardware, or acombination thereof. The order in which each operation of a given methodis performed may be changed, and various operations may be added,reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc. It is intended that theinvention(s) described herein embrace all such modifications and changesand, accordingly, the above description should be regarded in anillustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

The terms “tangible” and “non-transitory,” as used herein, are intendedto describe a computer-readable storage medium (or “memory”) excludingpropagating electromagnetic signals; but are not intended to otherwiselimit the type of physical computer-readable storage device that isencompassed by the phrase computer-readable medium or memory. Forinstance, the terms “non-transitory computer readable medium” or“tangible memory” are intended to encompass types of storage devicesthat do not necessarily store information permanently, including, forexample, RAM. Program instructions and data stored on a tangiblecomputer-accessible storage medium in non-transitory form may afterwardsbe transmitted by transmission media or signals such as electrical,electromagnetic, or digital signals, which may be conveyed via acommunication medium such as a network and/or a wireless link.

Unless stated otherwise, terms such as “first” and “second” are used toarbitrarily distinguish between the elements such terms describe. Thus,these terms are not necessarily intended to indicate temporal or otherprioritization of such elements. The terms “coupled” or “operablycoupled” are defined as connected, although not necessarily directly,and not necessarily mechanically. The terms “a” and “an” are defined asone or more unless stated otherwise. The terms “comprise” (and any formof comprise, such as “comprises” and “comprising”), “have” (and any formof have, such as “has” and “having”), “include” (and any form ofinclude, such as “includes” and “including”) and “contain” (and any formof contain, such as “contains” and “containing”) are open-ended linkingverbs. As a result, a system, device, or apparatus that “comprises,”“has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more elements possesses those oneor more elements but is not limited to possessing only those one or moreelements. Similarly, a method or process that “comprises,” “has,”“includes” or “contains” one or more operations possesses those one ormore operations but is not limited to possessing only those one or moreoperations.

Although the invention(s) is/are described herein with reference tospecific embodiments, various modifications and changes can be madewithout departing from the scope of the present invention(s), as setforth in the claims below. Accordingly, the specification and figuresare to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense,and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scopeof the present invention(s). Any benefits, advantages, or solutions toproblems that are described herein with regard to specific embodimentsare not intended to be construed as a critical, required, or essentialfeature or element of any or all the claims.

1. A workspace orchestration server, comprising: a processor; and amemory coupled to the processor, the memory having program instructionsstored thereon that, upon execution, cause the server to: maintain afirst workspace orchestration log; receive a second workspaceorchestration log from a client Information Handling System (IHS); andidentify the security attack, at least in part, in response to adiscrepancy between the first and second workspace orchestration logs.2. The workspace orchestration server of claim 1, wherein the firstworkspace orchestration log comprises one or more orchestrationoperations and a time of each orchestration operation as recorded by theworkspace orchestration server, and wherein the second workspaceorchestration log comprises one or more orchestration operations and atime of each orchestration operation as recorded by the client IHS. 3.The workspace orchestration server of claim 2, wherein the discrepancybetween the first and second workspace orchestration logs comprises atleast one of: a missing orchestration operation, or a different sequenceof orchestration operations.
 4. The workspace orchestration server ofclaim 2, wherein the orchestration operations comprise at least one of:a start of a workspace definition download, an end of a workspacedefinition download, a workspace instantiation, or a workspacemigration.
 5. The workspace orchestration server of claim 1, wherein theprogram instructions, upon execution, further cause the server toidentify the discrepancy using a sliding window.
 6. The workspaceorchestration server of claim 1, wherein the security attack comprises aPerson-in-the-Middle attack.
 7. The workspace orchestration server ofclaim 1, wherein the program instructions, upon execution, cause theserver to: receive a third workspace orchestration log from anotherworkspace orchestration server in communication with the client IHS; andidentify the security attack, at least in part, in response to adiscrepancy between the first and third workspace orchestration logs. 8.The workspace orchestration server of claim 1, wherein the programinstructions, upon execution, cause the server to: receive a thirdworkspace orchestration log from the client IHS over a redundantcommunication channel; and identify the security attack, at least inpart, in response to a discrepancy between the second and thirdworkspace orchestration logs.
 9. The workspace orchestration server ofclaim 1, wherein the program instructions, upon execution, cause theserver to: instruct another client IHS to instantiate a workspace basedupon a workspace definition used by the client IHS; receive a thirdworkspace orchestration log from the other client IHS; and identify thesecurity attack, at least in part, in response to a discrepancy betweenthe second and third workspace orchestration logs.
 10. The workspaceorchestration server of claim 1, wherein the program instructions, uponexecution, further cause the server to: compare a number of secondworkspace orchestration logs received from the client IHS against anumber of third workspace orchestration logs received from anotherclient IHS, wherein the client IHS is configured to instantiate aworkspace based upon a workspace definition, and wherein the otherclient IHS is configured to instantiate another workspace based upon theworkspace definition; and identify the security attack, at least inpart, in response to a deviation between the numbers of second and thirdworkspace orchestration logs.
 11. The workspace orchestration server ofclaim 1, wherein the program instructions, upon execution, further causethe server to: receive contextual measurements from the client IHS;compare the contextual measurements against golden measurementsassociated with a workspace definition of a workspace instantiated bythe client IHS; and identify the security attack, at least in part, inresponse to a difference between a contextual measurement and acorresponding golden measurement.
 12. The workspace orchestration serverof claim 11, wherein the contextual measurements comprise at least oneof: a thermal measurement, an acoustic measurement, a workspace memoryutilization, a network signature, or a communication latency.
 13. Theworkspace orchestration server of claim 11, wherein the programinstructions, upon execution, further cause the server to create thegolden measurements based upon average measurements collected from aplurality of client IHSs executing distinct instances of a workspaceinstantiated using a same workspace definition.
 14. A memory storagedevice having program instructions stored thereon that, upon executionby an Information Handling System (IHS), cause the IHS to: maintain afirst workspace orchestration log; receive a second workspaceorchestration log from a client IHS; receive contextual measurementsfrom the client IHS; receive golden measurements associated with aworkspace definition of a workspace instantiated by the client IHS; andidentify a security attack, at least in part, in response to at leastone of: (a) a discrepancy between the first and second workspaceorchestration logs, or (b) a difference between a contextual measurementand a corresponding golden measurement.
 15. The memory storage device ofclaim 14, wherein the discrepancy between the first and second workspaceorchestration logs comprises at least one of: a missing orchestrationoperation, or a different sequence of orchestration operations.
 16. Thememory storage device of claim 14, wherein the contextual measurementcomprises at least one of: a thermal measurement, an acousticmeasurement, a workspace memory utilization, a network signature, or acommunication latency.
 17. The memory storage device of claim 14,wherein the security attack comprises a Person-in-the-Middle attack. 18.A method, comprising: maintaining a first workspace orchestration log;receiving a second workspace orchestration log from a client InformationHandling System (IHS); receiving contextual measurements from the clientIHS; receiving golden measurements associated with a workspacedefinition of a workspace instantiated by the client IHS; andidentifying a security attack, at least in part, in response to: (a) adiscrepancy between the first and second workspace orchestration logs,and (b) a difference between a contextual measurement and acorresponding golden measurement.
 19. The method of claim 18, whereinthe discrepancy between the first and second workspace orchestrationlogs comprises at least one of: a missing orchestration operation, or adifferent sequence of orchestration operations, and wherein thecontextual measurement comprises at least one of: a thermal measurement,an acoustic measurement, a workspace memory utilization, a networksignature, or a communication latency.
 20. The method of claim 18,wherein the security attack comprises a Person-in-the-Middle attack.